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consumer’s ﬁnancial transactions give rise to a wealth of very per-
sonal data. Every credit card purchase, everyATM withdrawal, every
loan payment, every paycheck deposit leaves an electronic trace at a
person’s bank. Advances in information technology now allow ﬁrms to col-
late information from disparate sources and compile comprehensive proﬁles
of individual behavior. The resulting databases can allow businesses to target
very speciﬁc consumer categories—high-income, gun-owning dog lovers, for
example—in ways that were never before possible.
When should a bank be able to share information about you with other
businesses? Some consumer advocates want to protect consumers’ ﬁnancial
privacy by restricting such information sharing. New technologies, they say,
have encouraged increased intrusions on consumer privacy, leading to more
junk mail, more telemarketing calls, and a heightened risk of identity theft.
They argue for tough “opt-in” laws that would require ﬁnancial institutions
to obtain a consumer’s explicit consent before sharing personal information
about them.
Banks and other ﬁnancial service providers point out that information
sharing provides beneﬁts to consumers by allowing for more targeted market-
ing and services. The new technologies make it easier for businesses to ﬁnd
consumers that would be interested in buying their specialized products and
services—hunting-dog training supplies, for example. Such marketing di-
rectly beneﬁts consumers when it results in a voluntary purchase. In addition,
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greater information sharing can reduce wasteful marketing to consumers that
are likely to be uninterested. With these beneﬁts in mind, ﬁnancial service
providersarguefor“opt-out”lawsthatmerelyrequirethemtogiveconsumers
the right to request that their information not be shared.
Aftervigorousdebate,Congressadoptedanopt-outrequirementforbanks
andotherﬁnancialinstitutionsaspartoftheGramm-Leach-BlileyActof1999
(GLBA), legislation that was designed to encourage ﬁnancial modernization.
Any ﬁnancial institution that intends to share nonpublic customer informa-
tion with third parties (companies not related by ownership ties) must give
customers an opportunity to deny them permission to do so, or opt out. In ad-
dition, ﬁnancial institutions are required to provide customers with an annual
statement of their privacy policy. Consumers received a blizzard of notices
in the mail when those provisions were fully implemented in the summer of
2001.1
ThecontroversydidnotendwiththepassageoftheGLBA.TheActallows
individual states to adopt privacy provisions that are stricter than the federal
standard if they so desire. California’s legislature recently considered an
opt-in law that would have required ﬁnancial institutions to obtain customer
permission before sharing information with third parties. Moreover, banks
wouldhavebeenrequiredtogiveconsumerstherighttooptoutofinformation
sharing with afﬁliated companies (companies related by ownership ties).
This essay examines the opt-out/opt-in debate from the perspective of the
economics of ﬁnancial privacy. The premise is that a ﬁnancial institution’s
privacy policy is a characteristic of the products and services the institution
offers. We can therefore apply the well-understood principles governing how
markets work when there are important differences in product characteristics.
The result is surprising for both sides of the issue: it doesn’t seem to matter
whether opt-out or opt-in is adopted as the standard. Either way, competitive
forces should bring about an economically efﬁcient amount of information
sharing. In fact, even in the absence of opt-out or opt-in laws, the amount
of information sharing should be economically appropriate. Opt-out/opt-in
laws will be irrelevant as long as ﬁnancial institutions are not prevented from
offering customers a range of desirable privacy options.
The broad and multifaceted issues that surround privacy go well beyond
the opt-out/opt-in debate. Although this essay is narrowly focused on the lat-
ter, the general principles outlined here have a much wider application. At a
fundamental level, opt-out versus opt-in is really a question about the proper
1 The deadline for compliance was July 1, 2001. For more information on the ﬁnancial
privacy provisions of the GLBA, see the Federal Trade Commission’s Web site (Federal Trade
Commission 2002). The privacy provisions of the GLBA apply to any institution engaged in
activities that have been deemed “ﬁnancial in nature or incidental to such ﬁnancial activities” under
the Bank Holding Company Act. This means that whenever the Fed and the Treasury determine
that an activity is ﬁnancial in nature and therefore a permissible activity for a ﬁnancial holding
company, the entire ﬁnancial industry is brought under the privacy provisions of the GLBA.J. M. Lacker: Economics of Financial Privacy 3
allocation of “rights” in contractual relationships—a customer’s right to pri-
vacy versus the right of a ﬁnancial institution to share its information. The
answer economics provides is that whether rights are allocated in accord with
opt-out or opt-in is irrelevant, as long as consumers and ﬁnancial institutions
are free to agree to an alternative arrangement if it suits them. Most ﬁnancial
privacy questions concern the speciﬁcation of rights of various parties in con-
tractual relationships. The irrelevance result of this essay thus should carry
over to other related settings; laws and regulations providing more (or less)
“privacy rights” should generally have little effect on consumers’ ﬁnancial
privacy.2
1. PRIVACY IN THE FINANCIAL MARKETPLACE
Financial privacy can be thought of as a bundle of characteristics associated
with a particular ﬁnancial service. A bank that does not share nonpublic
customer information with third parties is providing its customers a service
with different characteristics from a bank that does share such information.
Howdomarketsworkwhenproductsorservicesdifferintheircharacteristics?
In well-functioning competitive markets, consumers selecting among
products with different bundles of characteristics are willing to pay more for
products with characteristics they value. Some characteristics make a product
more costly to provide. Producers are willing to supply products with more
costlycharacteristicsonlyiftheyarecompensatedfortheadditionalcost. One
would expect to see products with characteristics for which a customer’s will-
ingness to pay exceeds the incremental production cost. For example, some
people are willing to pay more for a car with a built-in CD player, but CD
players are costly. It is logical then that consumers whose willingness to pay
exceeds the cost of the CD player would own cars with CD players.
Well-functioning markets generally provide goods and services that are
appropriate when judged against the benchmark of economic efﬁciency. With
regardtoproductcharacteristics,economicefﬁciencymeansthatagivenprod-
uct characteristic is supplied if and only if the value of that characteristic to
consumers exceeds its cost to society. When markets function smoothly, the
incentives of producers and consumers are aligned with economic efﬁciency.
Suppliers ﬁnd it proﬁtable to provide products with the appropriate character-
istics, since consumers are willing to pay at least the additional cost. Charac-
teristics for which consumers’ valuations fall short of the cost of production
cannot be proﬁtably supplied.
Financial privacy is a service characteristic that some consumers prefer.
Many consumers harbor deep concerns about privacy in general and ﬁnancial
privacyinparticular. Accordingtoonerecentpoll,56percentofconsumerssay
2 For other economic analyses of ﬁnancial privacy, see Kahn, McAndrews, and Roberds (2000)
and Bauer (forthcoming).4 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
theyare“veryconcerned”aboutpotentiallossofprivacy.3 Overall,consumers
seemtohavethreemainfears.4 Theyfearbeingrobbedorcheatedbycriminals
that obtain personal information. They fear embarrassing revelations due to
the disclosure of sensitive information. And they dislike intrusive marketing
in the form of telephone calls or junk mail. When ﬁnancial institutions share
customer information with outside companies, it can erode customer privacy
on all three counts.
Providing greater ﬁnancial privacy can be costly for a ﬁnancial service
provider because it means foregoing the potential economic value of informa-
tion sharing. Marketers can make better decisions the more information they
have about prospective customers and are therefore willing to pay banks to
get it. Better information helps marketers ﬁnd customers who genuinely may
be interested in buying their products and saves them the expense of soliciting
consumerswhoarenot. Thesebeneﬁtsprovidegenuineeconomicvaluebyin-
creasing the probability of a successful buyer-seller match and decreasing the
probabilityofwastingmarketingeffortsonthosewhowouldnotbeinterested.
Consumers that place a high value on ﬁnancial privacy ought to be will-
ing to pay for high-privacy ﬁnancial services. If consumers prefer that their
banknotsharenonpublicinformationaboutthemwithunafﬁliatedcompanies,
they should be willing to pay for this service characteristic implicitly through
lowerdepositinterestrates,higherloaninterestrates,orhigheraccount-related
fees. More directly, banks could offer direct inducements—a bonus payment,
coupon, or sweepstakes entry, for example—to customers that agree to infor-
mation sharing. Many nonﬁnancial ﬁrms offer such enticements to customers
that return “product registration cards” ﬁlled out with their name, address,
and other information. Consumers that value ﬁnancial privacy would pay by
foregoingtheirbank’soffer. Similarly, manygrocerystoresoffercardstocus-
tomersthatqualifythemfordiscountswhentheypresentthecardsatcheckout
stations. In exchange, stores gather data on customer purchases.
Alongthesamelines,ifsharingnonpubliccustomerinformationwiththird
parties is economically beneﬁcial, ﬁnancial institutions should be willing to
compensate their customers who allow them to do so.5 The outside ﬁrms
with which the information is shared should be willing to pay an amount up
to the information’s value to them. The ﬁnancial institution should then be
willing to pass this along to their customers in the form of higher interest rates
on savings, lower interest rates on loans, or lower fees. More directly, they
shouldbewillingtosimplypaythosecustomerswhoagreetoshareanamount
up to the incremental value of the information.
Ideally, the economic beneﬁts of ﬁnancial privacy should be balanced
against the economic costs. When the economic value of sharing nonpublic
3 National Consumers League (2000).
4 Research by Alan Westin, as cited in Paul (2001).
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customer information with third parties falls short of the value consumers
place on preventing that information sharing, economic efﬁciency would dic-
tate that no information sharing takes place. Similarly, when the economic
value of sharing nonpublic customer information with third parties exceeds
thevalueconsumersplaceonpreventingit, economicefﬁciencywoulddictate
that information sharing should take place. If the market for ﬁnancial privacy
is well functioning, then we should see an economically efﬁcient amount of
ﬁnancial privacy.
2. DOES THE MARKET FOR FINANCIAL PRIVACY WORK
WELL?
Is there anything different about ﬁnancial privacy? Are the markets for ﬁnan-
cial privacy poorly functioning in the sense that they deliver outcomes that are
not economically efﬁcient? There does not appear to be any plausible reason
to think so.
Formarketstomisfunctioninthissense, oneoftwoconditionsmustexist:
either a divergence between the value of a product characteristic to consumers
and their willingness to pay it, or a divergence between the cost to suppliers
of providing that characteristic and the overall cost to society. Divergences
could be caused by externalities, monopoly power, or veriﬁcation problems.
Anexternalityoccurswhenanactionbyonegroupaffectsthewell-beingof
others that do not transact with that group. For example, burning leaves in my
front yard raises the risk of ﬁre for my suburban neighbor.6 Externalities are
often invoked to explain a broad range of government laws and regulations—
prohibiting suburban leaf burning, for example.
Is there an externality in the market for ﬁnancial privacy? No, it doesn’t
appear so. Sharing nonpublic customer information about a consumer affects
that consumer’s privacy but not the privacy of other consumers. The sharing
institution is a counterparty of the affected customer, and either can withdraw
from the relationship. The two of them have ample opportunity to take in-
formation sharing into account when setting the terms of their relationship.
Thus no parties are affected by the information sharing except those who are
participants in the transaction.
“Public goods” are a type of externality that can result in inefﬁciency
and are deﬁned by two properties. They are nonrivalrous, meaning that one
person’s use does not detract from the ability of another to use it. And they
are nonexcludable, meaning that one cannot prevent people from using it. A
lighthouseisaclassicexampleofapublicgood: oneship’susedoesnotprevent
6 One could argue that the two parties could negotiate an efﬁcient solution to this problem;
my neighbor can simply pay me not to burn leaves, or can sue me if the ﬁre spreads. For
additional explanation see the section on the Coase Theorem.6 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
another ship’s use, and you cannot prevent a ship from using it.7 Information
is nonrivalrous because one person’s use does not prevent another from using
the same information. But information is excludable because you can prevent
peoplefromobtainingit. Thereforeﬁnancialinformationisnotapublicgood.
Monopoly power is another possible cause of market misfunction. When
a ﬁrm is sheltered from competitive pressures it can raise prices and restrain
supply. Similarly, a protected monopolist may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to supply too
little of a desired product characteristic when customers are prevented from
seeking preferred characteristics from other suppliers. This problem may
havebeenrelevanttothebankingindustrydecadesagowhencompetitionwas
severely limited by regulatory restrictions on pricing, entry, and geographic
expansion, but these restrictions have been largely dismantled. As a conse-
quence, the market for ﬁnancial services is now widely judged to be relatively
competitive. Thus it seems unlikely that banks or other ﬁnancial institutions
are manipulating privacy policies because of signiﬁcant monopoly power.8
A third potential cause of market misfunction stems from the difﬁculty of
verifyingwhetheraﬁnancialinstitutionislivinguptoitsstatedprivacypolicy.
A customer that receives junk mail or telemarketing calls may have a hard
time discerning where the marketer obtained the information. The spelling of
a name or address can be altered slightly in order to trace information sharing,
but this technique is obviously limited. In cases of identity theft it is often
impossible to determine exactly how the identity was stolen after the fact.
Do veriﬁcation problems interfere with the efﬁciency of the market for
ﬁnancial privacy? Not necessarily. Note that there are a number of mecha-
nisms to help ensure that an institution lives up to its privacy commitments,
despite the difﬁculty of observing whether or not it has done so. First, an
institution that fails to comply with its stated ﬁnancial privacy policy may
be liable for “unfair and deceptive trade practices.” If caught, the institution
would be subject to civil litigation as well as regulatory action by the Federal
Trade Commission. The potential legal costs can deter noncompliance, even
if the probability of detection is small. There is nothing particularly unique
about ﬁnancial privacy in this regard. Consumers often rely on hard-to-verify
commitments by the ﬁrms they patronize—a commitment to product quality,
for example.
7 Coase (1974) pointed out, however, that coastal lighthouses are often funded from fees
charged to ships using nearby ports, so even the services of lighthouses are at times excludable.
A lighthouse is therefore only a public good when ships cannot be excluded from using its services
if they do not pay—for example, in settings where most ships are on long-distance voyages.
8 If ﬁnancial institutions were exercising market power and this resulted in inefﬁcient ﬁnancial
product characteristics, a more appropriate remedy would be for regulators to ensure effective
competition rather than regulate service characteristics. Moreover, it would appear inconsistent to
regulate service characteristics on the grounds of impediments to competition while not regulating
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Second, institutions that wish to attract customers for whom privacy is
important will want to convince those customers of their organization’s com-
mitment to its privacy policy. Such institutions will have an incentive to
cultivate and safeguard their reputation as a high-privacy entity. At least one
prominent bank has advertised a “no telemarketing” promise, indicating that
banks are capable of actively competing on the basis of their privacy poli-
cies.9 Third parties can evaluate a ﬁnancial institution’s compliance, just as
Consumer Reports independently assesses the quality of consumer products.
The potential for embarrassing media publicity also motivates an institution
to live up to its commitments. Standard industry practice is for a ﬁrm that
rents its mailing list to approve every mailing or telemarketing script that is
used. Evidently ﬁrms believe that at least some consumers could trace mar-
keting contacts to them, with possibly detrimental effects on their customer
relationships.
Whilereputationalconsiderationsandlawsontradepracticescangopart-
way toward ensuring that a ﬁrm is faithful to its stated privacy policy, some
would argue that these mechanisms are inherently limited and imperfect. En-
forcement is often costly and compliance is rarely 100 percent. Do these
imperfections warrant legislative restrictions aimed speciﬁcally at informa-
tion sharing? No. Any entity attempting to verify and enforce a ﬁnancial
ﬁrm’s privacy commitments will confront the same imperfections. A gov-
ernmental effort to enforce a ban on information sharing, for example, will
face the same veriﬁcation difﬁculties—costly enforcement and incomplete
compliance—as would any private parties. So a government ban on informa-
tion sharing would have no advantage; in fact, it would have the disadvantage
of possibly preventing economically useful information sharing.
Themarketforﬁnancialprivacythereforeappearstoworkfairlywell. This
means that we should expect economically efﬁcient outcomes: information
will be shared if and only if the economic beneﬁts of information sharing
exceed the value consumers place on preventing information sharing.
3. OPT-OUT VERSUS OPT-IN
Providedthemarketforﬁnancialprivacyworksfairlywell, itshouldnotmake
muchdifferencewhetherweadoptanopt-outlaworanopt-inlaw. Eitherway,
an economically efﬁcient level of information sharing will result. Why is this
so?
Underanopt-outlaw, banksthatvalueinformationsharingwillbewilling
to provide inducements to get high-privacy customers not to opt out because
9 The phrase appeared in television advertising for Capital One during November 2001. As
of this writing (January 17, 2002), the company’s home page prominently features the following
description of their “New No-Hassle Card”: “9.9% Fixed APR on Everything, No Telemarketing,
No Annual Fee.”8 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
information sharing can lower the cost of providing banking services. Simi-
larly, automakers are willing to discount the price of cars without CD players,
sincethesecarsarelesscostlytobuild. Bankswillbewillingtopayanamount
up to the incremental value of sharing the customer’s nonpublic information.
Ifthatfallsshortofthevaluethecustomerimplicitlyplacesonprivacy,thenthe
customer will decline the inducement and opt out. In that case, the economic
value of the information sharing is less than the cost to the customer of yield-
ing this bit of privacy, and information sharing is not economically efﬁcient.
Alternatively, the customer may feel that the value of the inducement exceeds
the value of preventing information sharing, in which case the inducement is
accepted and the customer does not opt out. Here, the economic value of the
information sharing exceeds the cost to the customer of yielding this bit of
privacy, and information sharing is economically efﬁcient.
Under an opt-in law, the reasoning and the result are exactly the same.
Banks will be willing to provide the same inducement to get a customer to opt
in as they would have provided to get a customer to refrain from opting out—
up to the economic value of the information sharing. If that amount exceeds
the value that the customer places on preventing information sharing, then
information sharing will take place and is economically efﬁcient. Otherwise
the customer will refuse the enticement; in this case information sharing is
not economically efﬁcient and will not take place.
In fact, the same reasoning applies in the absence of opt-out or opt-in
laws. If the law is silent on whether banks need to seek permission to share
nonpublicinformationwiththirdparties,banksnonethelesscoulddecidetodo
so on their own. If some customers truly care about information sharing with
third parties, they will seek out banks that give them the option of preventing
it. Ifinformationsharingiseconomicallyuseful,bankswillﬁnditmorecostly
to serve customers that insist on preventing it. Competition will force banks
to pass along the increased cost to high-privacy customers. Ultimately, an
economically appropriate amount of information sharing will take place, with
or without opt-out or opt-in laws.
The difference between opt-out and opt-in standards is like the difference
between treating CD players in cars as standard equipment or as an add-on
option. If CD players are an option, one would expect the price of the option




quantity of cars with CD players.
The debate between proponents of opt-out and opt-in seems predicated
on the view that the choice would affect how many consumers would pre-
vent information sharing. The hypothesis seems to be that fewer consumers
would opt out under an opt-out standard than would fail to opt in under anJ. M. Lacker: Economics of Financial Privacy 9
opt-in standard. This could well be the case, but it would be evidence that
many consumers are relatively indifferent about information sharing by their
ﬁnancial institution; they would not bother to opt out, nor would they bother
to opt in. If this is true, then little is at stake for these consumers. Those who
would neither opt out nor opt in evidently place little value on preventing their
ﬁnancialinstitutionfromsharingnonpublicinformationaboutthem. Theeco-
nomic efﬁciency implications of the choice between opt-out and opt-in would
therefore be negligible for them as well, even if participation rates differed
signiﬁcantly.
4. ANALTERNATIVE LINE OF REASONING: THE COASE
THEOREM
The knowledgeable reader may have noticed that the logic of this essay is
closely related to the insights that Ronald H. Coase presented in his cele-
brated paper “The Problem of Social Cost.”10 (This paper was cited by the
Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences in awarding him the 1991 Nobel Prize
in Economics.) Coase wrestled with the issue of externalities, the same issue
as in my leaf-burning example. Before Coase’s paper economists generally
believed that, absent government intervention, externalities would result in
inefﬁcient outcomes because one party (I, for example) would ignore the cost
(increased ﬁre hazard) that his action (leaf burning) imposed on another party
(my neighbor). The contribution of Coase was to notice that the two parties
could negotiate an efﬁcient solution to the externality problem as long as the
relevant rights were clearly assigned. For example, if I am entitled to burn
leaves, myneighborcouldoffertopaymenotto, orcouldoffertohelpmedis-
pose of them by some other method. Alternatively, if I am required to obtain
my neighbor’s permission to burn leaves, I could offer to pay my neighbor. If
the value to me of burning leaves is less than the value to my neighbor of my
not burning leaves, then my neighbor will pay me not to do so in the ﬁrst case.
In the second case, I will be unwilling to offer my neighbor enough money to
get permission to burn leaves. Either way we get an efﬁcient outcome; I don’t
burn leaves. The general proposition is that (under certain conditions) any
well-deﬁned allocation of property rights leads to efﬁcient outcomes. This
result is often called the Coase Theorem.
The application to ﬁnancial privacy should be clear. Opt-out and opt-
in are just different allocations of property rights. Opt-out means ﬁnancial
institutionshavetherighttoshareinformation;customerscanaskthemtostop.
Opt-in means customers have the right to no-information-sharing; ﬁnancial
10 Coase (1960).10 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
institutions can ask them for permission to share. Either way, according to
Coase, the prediction is an efﬁcient amount of information sharing.
The Coase Theorem has its limitations, however. It is said to hold only





of property rights can affect efﬁciency. One premise of this essay, as I discuss
later, is that the costs of opting out are negligible, in which case the Coase
Theorem applies.11
The logic of this essay, however, differs subtly from Coase’s analysis.
Coase envisioned bargaining between affected parties. As a result, the assign-
ment of property rights could alter the distribution of net beneﬁts, even if that
assignmenthadnoeffectonefﬁciency. Forexample, ifIhavetherighttoburn
leaves,Igetpaidnottoburnthem;yetifIneedpermission,Iearnnothingwhen
I don’t burn them. I am better off in the ﬁrst case, while my neighbor is better
off in the second case. The assignment of rights thus alters the relative well-
beingofmyneighborandme, eventhougheitherassignmentleadstoefﬁcient
leaf-burning decisions. In competitive markets, in contrast, the assignment of
contractual rights generally does not affect people’s well-being. The choice
between opt-out and opt-in determines which rights are, by default, bundled
together with ﬁnancial services. Under either regime, competition and free
entry implies that both high-privacy and low-privacy ﬁnancial services will
be available at prices reﬂecting their true cost. In competitive markets, the
choice of regime should have no effect on the net cost of ﬁnancial services
withparticularcharacteristics, justasalawmandatingthatCDplayersbesold
separatelyshouldhavenoeffectonthetotalpriceofcarswithCDplayers. The
efﬁciency implication of Coase’s famous theorem carries over to competitive
markets, however, and buttresses the case made here: market mechanisms
should work well at providing an efﬁcient level of ﬁnancial privacy.
5. OPT-OUT IN PRACTICE: FEW CONSUMERS DO
Duringtheﬁrsthalfof2001,manybanksbeganmailingouttheprivacynotices
requiredbytheGLBA.Thosethatsharenonpubliccustomerinformationwith
unafﬁliated companies are required to give their customers the opportunity
11 The costs are negligible in part because of the regulations that require ﬁnancial institutions
to provide customers with a “reasonable means” of opting out. In a sense, then, this part of the
allocation of property rights has efﬁciency implications consistent with the Coase Theorem. The
reasonable-means provision appears to be an efﬁcient choice since it minimizes the “transaction
costs” of opting out. Friedman (2000) applies Coase’s approach to a broad array of privacy issues
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to opt out of third-party information sharing. Although there is only limited
evidence so far, press reports suggest that the response rate is rather low.
According to the trade publicationAmerican Banker, industry estimates of the
number of consumers who have opted out “hover around 5 percent.”12 One
survey of savings banks showed that more than half were experiencing an
opt-out rate of one percent or less.13
Opting out does not appear to be very hard. The ﬁnancial privacy regula-
tions require that ﬁnancial institutions give customers a “reasonable means”
of exercising their right to opt out. The regulations even offer examples of
acceptable and unacceptable methods. Providing a toll-free number to call
or supplying a mail-in card for a check-box response are deemed reasonable
means. Requiring a customer to write his or her own letter is not deemed
reasonable.
Despite these requirements, critics claim that opting out is difﬁcult be-
cause privacy notices are complex, confusing, and hard to read.14 Food labels
are often cited, in contrast, as a simple, well-understood notice system. Some
ﬁnancialinstitutions,however,areactivelyworkingtowardsimplerandclearer
privacy notices.15 Apparently, they view that it is in their business interest to
make their notices as agreeable to their customers as possible. Many institu-
tions sent privacy notices for the ﬁrst time in 2001, and some experimentation
and learning seem to be taking place. Perhaps opt-out rates will rise as GLBA
privacy notices are reﬁned and consumers learn about what they contain.
Nevertheless, the fact that so few bank customers are currently taking
the relatively easy step of opting out seems to indicate that most consumers
now place a negligible value on preventing ﬁnancial institutions from sharing
nonpublic information about them with third parties. A small fraction of
consumers feel strongly enough to take advantage of the opt-out option. This
group appears to place a signiﬁcant value on guarding their ﬁnancial privacy.
ButforabroadmajorityofAmericans,thevaluetheyplaceonﬁnancialprivacy
does not exceed the inconvenience of exercising their right to opt out.16
This pattern—about 5 percent of people willing to take action to protect
their privacy—is consistent with other evidence on consumers’ privacy pref-
erences. The Direct MarketingAssociation, a marketing industry trade group,
12 Lee (2001).
13America’s Community Bankers (2001).
14 See transcripts and supporting documentation from the workshop on effective privacy no-
tices hosted by the Federal Trade Commission and the federal ﬁnancial regulatory agencies (Federal
Trade Commission 2001).
15 See the presentations by Marty Abrams, John Dugan, Patricia Faley, and David M. Klaus
at the privacy notices workshop along with the public comments submitted by Walter Kitchenman,
Vance Gudmundsen, and Steve Bartlett in connection with the event (Federal Trade Commission
2001).
16 One could argue that consumers are just lazy, but this reasoning leads to the same con-
clusion; the value they place on ﬁnancial privacy is not enough to motivate them to opt out.12 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
offers consumers the ability to opt out of telephone or mail marketing by their
members. The4.2millionparticipantsintheirtelephoneopt-outprogramrep-
resent about 4.2 percent of U.S. households with telephone service. The 4.0
million participants in their mail opt-out program represent about 3.8 percent
of total U.S. households.17
A very low opt-out rate is also consistent with other choices consumers
make with regard to privacy. Few consumers disable cookies when browsing
theInternet. (CookiesaresmallﬁlesthataWebsiteplacesonauser’scomputer
to enable tracking the user on subsequent visits.) Few consumers read privacy
notices. Many consumers readily provide their credit card number over the
phone or to a waiter.18 The picture that emerges, then, is that a few consumers
place signiﬁcant value on preventing information sharing by their ﬁnancial
institutions, but the broad majority of consumers are relatively indifferent.
6. OPT-OUT IN PRACTICE: FEW BANKS PAY
Financialinstitutionsdonotappeartobeofferinginducementstocustomersto
get them to refrain from opting out. This suggests that the economic value of
sharingnonpubliccustomerinformationisrelativelylow. Otherwiseﬁnancial
institutions would ﬁnd it worthwhile to compensate their customers for their
cooperation. In fact, not all institutions are even engaged in information
sharing that would trigger the opt-out requirement. A survey of savings banks
found that fewer than one-third needed to send out opt-out notices.19
Banks do not lack opportunities to share customer information. There
is an active market for consumers’ names, addresses, and other personal in-
formation. Individual merchants rent their customer lists to marketers, often
throughlistbrokers. Creditbureausofferselectionsfromtheirdatabasesbased
on age, income, occupation, family status, net worth, type of automobile, re-
ligion, and so on. According to its Web site, Equifax even offers a selection
based on a person’s carburetor type. American Express offers customer lists
selected on the basis of purchase patterns—shoe buyers that spend more than
$1000annually,forexample. Listsareavailablefrommagazines,membership
organizations, book clubs, and merchants.20
17 The three main credit bureaus also offer a program through their trade group that allows
consumers to opt out of pre-approved credit offers, but the credit bureaus do not release statistics
on the number of consumers opting out.
18According to a recent survey, 24 percent of consumers protect their privacy by disabling
cookies (Harris Interactive Inc. 2001). An American Bankers Association poll found that 36 percent
of consumers said they had read their bank’s privacy notice (American Bankers Association 2001).
19America’s Community Bankers (2001).
20 For information on lists see Equifax (2001), American List Counsel (2002), and Worldata
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Apparently, the market for consumer information does not provide banks




per name as of early 2001. Base prices at one large credit bureau range from
1.65 to 4 cents per name per mailing, depending on volume, with add-on
charges for additional selection criteria ranging from .25 cents per name for
length of residence, title, or gender to 2 cents per name for net worth. Thus
the value to a ﬁnancial institution of sharing nonpublic customer information
might not be large enough to warrant offering a signiﬁcant sum to customers.
7. WHY IS FINANCIAL PRIVACYAN ISSUE NOW?
Applying economics to ﬁnancial privacy leads to the conclusion that ﬁnancial
markets can provide an appropriate balance between consumers’ desires for
privacy and the economic value of information sharing. If this is true, then
why do surveys show widespread consumer concern about privacy yet few
consumerstakingactiontooptoutofinformationsharing? Andwhyhasthere
been such clamor for privacy legislation in the past few years, culminating in
the ﬁnancial privacy provisions of the GLBA?
The dramatic changes in communications and computing technologies in
recent years might help explain why so many recent surveys report consumer
concern about privacy. Financial institutions have always possessed detailed
information about their customers. Moreover, active markets for customer
listshavebeenaroundfordecades.21 Onlyrecently,however,hasthecollation
and analysis of information from disparate sources become highly automated.
Thistechnologicaladvanceallowsmoretargetedmarketingefforts;acompany
can solicit high-income, gun-owning dog lovers, for example. The resulting
improvement in marketing success rates appears to have led to an increase in
the number of mail and telephone solicitations.
Before the technological developments that lowered the cost of manip-
ulating databases, assembling such detailed consumer proﬁles was not eco-
nomicallyfeasible. Consumerscametoviewthelimitednatureofinformation
sharing by ﬁnancial institutions as an implicit part of their contractual rela-
tionship, relying on the practical obscurity of what other ﬁrms knew about
21 I recall my father managing rentals of his company’s mailing list in the 1960s. The list
was kept on “addressograph plates”—metal strips embossed with names and addresses. While these
strips could be linked together for automated addressing of mass mailings, any sorting or selection
had to be handled manually. The list was rented out through mailing houses that handled the actual
printing and distribution. All rentals had to be approved by list owners. Decoys—false names and
addresses—were included in the list to provide a means of veriﬁcation by the list owner.14 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
them.22 Since widespread information sharing was impractical then, few sur-
veys asked how consumers felt about it. New technologies have dispersed the
fog of practical obscurity that formerly surrounded many consumer transac-
tions. The privacy concerns that appear in consumer surveys could represent
ex post regret at the lack of contractual constraints on information sharing.
This conﬂicts, however, with the evidence cited earlier indicating that most
consumers do not feel strongly about information sharing. Alternatively, per-
haps consumer preferences haven’t changed, but consumers are merely asked
about them more often today. Now that interﬁrm information sharing is eco-
nomically viable, we see surveys on the subject.
Economists are often skeptical of survey evidence on consumer prefer-
ences, but it is not the sincerity of consumers’responses that is in doubt. Sur-
veys rarely confront consumers with the cost consequences of their choices.
When asked whether they desire greater privacy without reference to cost,
they are likely to say “yes”—more of a good is generally preferred to less,
after all. But when confronted with real-life choices, many consumers decide
that the beneﬁts of greater privacy are outweighed by the costs. One recent
study found a dramatic disparity between consumers’ stated privacy prefer-
ences and their actual online behavior.23 Participants answered many “highly
personal” questions, despite having stated that privacy was important to them.
Thediscrepancybetweenwidespreadconsumer“concern”andthewillingness
of many consumers to readily compromise their privacy could well reﬂect the
gap between the artiﬁcial choices implicit in survey questions and the real
choices consumers actually face.24
8. CONCLUSION
The economics of ﬁnancial privacy is based on the notion that a ﬁnancial
institution’s privacy policy is a characteristic associated with the products
and services the institution offers. In well-functioning markets, prices reﬂect
product characteristics; consumers are willing to pay more for characteristics
they value, and producers charge more for characteristics that are more costly
tosupply. Consumersthatvalueﬁnancialprivacyoughttobewillingtopayfor
privacy policies that they prefer. And if it is economically beneﬁcial to share
information with other companies, ﬁnancial institutions ought to be willing
to compensate their customers for permission to do so. The fact that few
banks seem to be paying customers not to opt out is strong evidence that the
economic value of information sharing is relatively small. And the fact that so
22 Gramlich (1999).
23 Spiekermann, Grossklags, and Berendt (no date available).
24 Harper and Singleton (2001).J. M. Lacker: Economics of Financial Privacy 15
fewconsumersareoptingout,despitethelowcostofdoingso,isevidencethat
few consumers place a signiﬁcant value on preventing information sharing.
This line of reasoning also leads to a stark and surprising conclusion: the
choice between opt-out and opt-in standards is irrelevant. Under an opt-out
standard, banks could pay customers to refrain from opting out, while under
an opt-in standard banks could pay customers to opt in. Either way, ﬁnancial
marketsshoulddeliveranefﬁcientamountofinformationsharing. Onepuzzle
remains, however: Why is ﬁnancial privacy such a controversial issue if few
consumers care enough about preventing information sharing to take simple
stepstopreventit? Nevertheless,theeconomicsoftheissueisclear—ﬁnancial
privacy laws like the GLBA accomplish less than either privacy advocates or
their critics presume.
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